Economic relations between China and Latin America have grown rapidly over the past decade. The paper documents the growth of trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and other financial flows between China and Latin America and identifies the interests of China in the region as a source of raw materials, a market for exports of manufactured goods and an area of diplomatic competition with Taiwan. It points to the asymmetric nature of the relationship in terms of the relative importance of bilateral trade to each partner, the composition of trade flows, and the balance of FDI flows. It shows that these show many of the characteristics of centre-periphery relations. However China is far from becoming a new hegemonic power in Latin America and the latter's relations with the United States and Europe continue to be more significant than those with China.
Introduction
Economic relations between China and Latin America have grown rapidly over the past decade. The most striking manifestation of this has been the growth of bilateral trade but this has been accompanied by closer diplomatic relations with Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela being recognised as "strategic partners" by China since 2000 2 and the Chinese government issuing its first Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008. 3 During the same period, Chile, Costa Rica and Peru signed free trade agreements with China.
The growing involvement of China in Latin America has not attracted as much attention or controversy as its role in Africa and the academic literature, although growing, is more limited. Nevertheless it has given rise to debates concerning both the economic impact of China on the region and the political implications in particular whether China represents a challenge to US hegemony in Latin America. 4 This paper will focus on three aspects of the economic relations between China and Latin America, namely bilateral trade, foreign direct investment, and financial flows, particularly aid. The paper documents the extent and growth of economic relations with China and asks how significant they are relative to those with the region's other major partners. Is China replacing the West as an engine of growth for the region, or is it a new source of dependency? In considering these questions, the asymmetric nature of the economic relations between China and Latin America will be analysed.
The Growing Economic Relations between China and Latin America a) Trade
Latin American exports to China have grown spectacularly in recent years. While trade with China was expanding during most of the 1990s, a sharp increase in Chinese imports from the region occurred after 1999 (see Fig.1 ). 5 A further inflection point occurs in
2002 when the growth of Chinese imports from the region accelerated further. Since this pattern holds for all the major Latin American countries exporting to China, it would seem that the explanation must be sought in events in China rather than developments in the various Latin American countries. One explanation is that resource constraints really began to bite in China at the end of the 1990s. This view is supported by the sharp increase in China's net trade deficit in a number of primary commodities which feature prominently in Latin America's exports such as copper, iron ore, nickel and soybeans from the late 1990s. 6 . The share of China in total Latin American exports, having been stable during the 1990s, increased almost seven-fold between 2000 and 2010 (see Table 1 ). In 1990 only Cuba, of the nineteen Latin American countries listed in Table 1 , had a significant share of total exports going to China. By 2000, prior to China's accession to the WTO, Chile, Peru and
Uruguay had increased their share of exports to China to over 5% of total exports, but
China remained a relatively minor market even for these countries. By 2009
however China was the top export market for Brazil, Chile and Cuba and the second most important for Colombia, Costa Rica and Peru. However not all Latin American countries have participated equally in the boom of exports to China. While China accounted for over 9% of the region's total exports in 2010, the shares for individual countries ranged from less than 2% of total exports in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Paraguay and several Central American countries, to over 15% in Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Peru (see Table 1 ). One obvious reason for this is that all those countries which had a low share of exports to China, apart from Mexico and Ecuador, still recognise Taiwan and therefore do not have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. In contrast, the close political ties between Cuba and China and the fact that Cuba is excluded from its closest market, the USA, helps explain the high level of trade between the two countries.
Latin American imports from China have also grown significantly in recent years. 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics
China's share in total imports to Latin America grew gradually during the 1990s but then increased more than five-fold between 2000 and 2010 (see Table 2 ). In 1990 only Cuba registered significant imports from China. Table 2 also shows the increasing share of imports from China in individual Latin American countries. Although the share of China varies between countries, the differences are not as marked as in the case of exports. 
b) Foreign Direct Investment
China launched its "Going Out" strategy to encourage Chinese companies to invest overseas in 2000 but until the mid-2000s the level of Chinese FDI remained relatively low. 7 However since then Chinese FDI has grown rapidly and in 2010 it was the fifth country in the world in terms of outward investment flows. 8 As global FDI outflows fell dramatically with the financial crisis, China increased its share of the total from less than 1% in 2007 to over 4% in 2009. 9 Chinese FDI in Latin America has also grown rapidly in recent years (see Table 3 ), but in FDI flows to the region were less than $1 billion (see Table 3 ) which compares to Chinese exports of goods of more than US$175 billion in the same year (see Figure 2 ). 
c) Financial Flows
Systematic information on other financial flows from China to Latin America is even more difficult to come by than data on FDI. This in part reflects the difficulty in classifying different types of capital flows and the problem in the case of China in distinguishing between FDI, commercial loans and aid, when these are often packaged together. Table 4 . Table 5 provides one estimate of financial flows from China to Latin America. Although 
Latin America's Role for China
From the point of view of China, there are three key interests in terms of its relations with Latin America. 14 First and foremost, it is an important source of the primary commodities that China needs to supply its rapidly growing industrial sector with energy and raw materials and to meet increasing demand for foodstuffs associated with rising income levels. Second, it is an expanding market for manufactured goods and the Chinese government has been keen to improve market access for the country's exporters. 
a) Latin America as a source of raw materials
The clearest evidence of the importance of Latin America as a source of raw materials for
China is the structure of the region's exports and the way that these have evolved over time. Primary products accounted for over 70% of Latin American exports to China in 2008 and resource-based manufactures (i.e. primary products with a limited degree of processing) for a further 16% (see Table 6 ). The main products exported from the region to China were copper ore and concentrates, soybean and soya oil, iron ore, crude oil, refined copper and fishmeal. Latin American exports to China are much more heavily concentrated on primary products and resource based manufactures than the region's exports to the rest of the world, where primary products make up less than 40% of the total (Table 4 ). Also the trend over time has been for the share of primary products in Latin American exports to China to increase significantly, while their share in exports to the rest of the world is lower than in 1990. The increased share of primary products in exports to China has come partly at the expense of exports of resource based manufactures. Securing access to natural resources has also been an important factor in other forms of financial flows from China to Latin America too. A report by the U.S. Congressional
Research Service reported that over two-thirds of the projects financed by China in the region were in the natural resource sector, while 28% were in infrastructure and public works, part of which may also have been related to gaining access to raw materials. Although China's exports to the US, Europe and the rest of Asia are far more significant than its exports to Latin America, gaining access to the Latin American market is an important aspect of the relationship. While exports to Latin America account for only 5% of China's total exports they have been growing rapidly in recent years. China is keen to diversify its export markets in order to reduce its dependence on the US and other developed country markets. 19 Also the slowdown in growth in North America and Europe as a result of the financial crisis and the rapid recovery in Latin America since 2009 has increased the attraction of the region as an expanding market.
The rapid growth of imports from China has been a cause of concern in many Latin
American countries giving rise to complaints from local manufacturers about "unfair"
competition from Chinese goods. China has become a major target for anti-dumping and safeguard measures in several Latin American countries. In Argentina the government introduced a set of measures in 2007 aimed at restricting imports of plastic products, leather products, textile and footwear, metal tools, electrical machinery, tires, optical and clockwork instruments and toys from Asian countries, particularly China. 20 Brazil has also used anti-dumping measures more extensively against China than against any other country. 21 Mexico has experienced more trade conflict with China than any other Latin American country and until recently maintained high import duties on more than 1,300 tariff items. 22 An important objective of Chinese diplomacy in the region has been to improve market access for Chinese goods. One way in which it has tried to do this is by obtaining "market economy" status from Latin American governments. 23 Some of the other financial flows from China to Latin America can also be seen as partly reflecting an interest in the region's market. This is particularly true in the case of government support for infrastructure projects which often requires 50% of project materials and services to be sourced from China. 26 Some major Chinese firms which have been involved in large infrastructure projects in Latin America such as Sinohydro in power and Huawei in telecommunications are in fact engaged in exporting equipment to the region. 27 If, as has been suggested, investment in infrastructure in China will tail off in the foreseeable future, then there will be more pressure on Chinese construction and other companies to look for new markets overseas.
c) China and Taiwan
The PRC's "One China Policy" means that it will not maintain diplomatic relations with countries that recognize Taiwan and it has sought to isolate the latter internationally. Chinese aid to the region is clearly influenced by the diplomatic competition between the PRC and Taiwan. Those countries recognizing Taiwan receive substantial amounts of aid from Taipei. 31 On the other hand, Costa Rica's shift in allegiance in 2007 was followed by aid to build a new national stadium and for reconstruction following major floods, as well as a major Chinese purchase of a $300 million Costa Rican bond issue. 
An Asymmetric Relation
Despite the rhetoric of South-South cooperation and mutual benefit that surrounds relations between China and Latin America, 33 in a number of respects the relationship is profoundly asymmetric. In this section the main emphasis will be on trade flows since, as was noted earlier, this has up to now been the crucial dimension of economic relations with China.
a) The significance of bilateral trade for China and Latin America
A first asymmetry is that China is much more important as a trade partner to Latin
America than the region is to China. This was not always the case but has become increasingly so in recent years. In 2000, although bilateral trade was still relatively limited, Latin America was marginally more significant to China than China was to Latin
America with China accounting for 1.9% of Latin America's total trade while Latin America accounted for 2.1% of China's trade. By 2010 the relative significance had been reversed with 11.6% of Latin American trade being with China while the region accounted for only 7.1% of China's trade. 34 In fact given that relations are at the level of individual countries, it is more relevant to compare the relative significance in these terms as well. As was noted earlier, China is the most important export market for three Latin American economies and second most important market for a further three. Source: own elaboration from UNCOMTRADE data Even at the level of the major commodities that Latin America exports, it is much more dependent on the Chinese market than China is on the Latin American countries as a source of supply. Table 7 and China has invested heavily in smelting and refining capacity. 37 Brazil's trade with China in the iron and steel value chain also show a tendency towards "primarization"
with exports increasingly being of iron ore and pig iron as opposed to steel and steel products. In terms of the type of goods imported from China, the pattern is the reverse of that noted for Latin American exports to China. Virtually all Latin American imports from China in 2008 were manufactured goods and almost 90% were non-resource based manufactures (see Table 8 ). Contrary to some popular perceptions, imports from China are not predominantly of low tech goods which accounted for just over a fifth of the total by
2008. While over a quarter are made up of medium-technology goods, more than twofifths of imports from China were high technology goods. 39 Since 2000, the share of high-tech imports from China has been increasing while that of low-tech products has tended to fall (see Table 8 ).
The structure of trade between China and Latin America has been increasingly characterized by the centre-periphery type of relation with Latin America exporting primary products and resource based manufactures in exchange for Chinese manufactured goods. Thus whereas in 1990 roughly two-thirds of Latin American exports to China were primary products and resource-base manufactures and two-thirds of imports from China were non-resource-based manufactures, by 2008, the respective shares had both increased to almost 90% (see Tables 6 and 8 ). Moreover the types of manufactured goods imported from China have become increasingly technologyintensive over time. Thus, in contrast to the rhetoric of South-South cooperation, the reality demonstrated by the trade pattern is the type of centre-periphery exchange that has been a concern in Latin America for more than half a century.
c) Export Concentration
Another common concern where exports are predominantly made up of primary commodities is the lack of diversification in terms of products exported. This is certainly true in terms of the region's exports to China where each country depends heavily on one or two products. In Argentina soybeans and their derivatives account for the bulk of exports. 40 In Chile around 80% of exports are of copper, 41 while in Brazil it is soybeans and iron ore that dominate. 42 The other major South American exporter to China, Peru relies heavily on exports of copper and fishmeal. What is more, the trend has been for exports to become increasingly concentrated in a small number of products over recent years. Source: own elaboration from UNCTADStat database
One commonly used index of export concentration is the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index.
The index is normalized so that it takes values from 0 to 1 which represents the maximum level of concentration. Table 9 compares the concentration of Latin American exports to China with that of China's exports to Latin America. It is based on the 3-digit level of the SITC Rev.3. The index shows that Latin America's exports to China are much more highly concentrated than China's exports to Latin America as might be expected.
Comparing the bilateral exports of individual Latin American countries and China would likely show even greater differences in terms of the level of concentration of exports from Latin America. Table 9 also shows that there is no tendency for Latin American exports to China to become more diversified. Quite to the contrary, the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index has in fact increased since 2005. This is a further asymmetry in the trade relation between
China and the region.
Not only are exports to China concentrated in terms of products, but also in terms of the firms involved. For example, five firms account for over 60% of Chilean exports to China, 43 while in Argentina the top ten firms make up more than 70% of exports. 44 Brazil's exports to China also appear to be similarly concentrated in a handful of large companies. The most extreme example in the region is probably Costa Rica where Intel is responsible for 85% of the country's exports to China. This suggests that the benefits from exports to China may also be highly concentrated.
d) FDI and financial flows
The asymmetry in terms of FDI flows between China and Latin America is less marked than in trade and less significant because of the relatively low level of FDI. Nevertheless the trend could also be seen towards China increasingly taking the role of an industrial centre vis-à-vis a Latin American periphery. 
A New Dependency on China?
While there is strong evidence that the economic relation between Latin America and China has centre-periphery characteristics, it is quite another question to ask whether this means that China is becoming a new hegemonic power in the region. Alternatively the issue could be presented in a more positive light by considering whether China is becoming a new engine of growth for the Latin American economy. From both standpoints the key question is how significant is China today and in the foreseeable future for the Latin American economies?
Despite the fact that China has become the major export market for some Latin American countries, in aggregate just over 8% of the region's total exports went to China in 2010, whereas the United States accounted for 41% and the EU for 13% of exports in the same year. 45 Similarly, although the share of China in the region's imports was rather higher at over 13% in 2010, this was still less than the 31% of imports that came from the US and the 14% from the EU. This should warn us against exaggerating the impact that trade with China will have on the region.
Nevertheless, the trend over the past decade has been for the share of the US in both
Latin American imports and exports to decline while that of the EU has remained roughly constant and China's has increased significantly. The Economic Commission for Latin America has projected, based on data for sixteen Latin American countries, that by 2020
China will have overtaken the EU as both an export destination and as a source of imports for the region, and will have narrowed the gap with the US. 46 In 2020 it is projected that China will account for almost a fifth of Latin American exports and a sixth of imports.
In terms of FDI, China's role in the region continues to be marginal. Despite the significant recent growth of Chinese investment in the region, in 2010 China accounted for less than 0.3% of the total stock of foreign capital in the region and its share of FDI inflows in that year was only 0.8%. 47 Even though the official figures may underestimate the true extent of Chinese FDI and a number of major new investments were made in 2010, the role of Chinese firms in the region remains very limited. As they continue to expand globally, their presence in Latin America is likely to become more significant in the future. Nevertheless Chinese FDI is starting from such a low base that it will be some time before it achieves levels comparable to that of US or EU FDI in the region. China in the same year was only $3.6 billion. In other words increased exports to China only compensated for less than 2% of the fall in exports to other countries. The second counter-factual considered is a scenario where exports to China fell at the same rate as exports to the rest of the world. Since this would imply an overall drop in the level of exports to China, as opposed to the first scenario where there was no increase in exports, the difference compared to the actual change in exports is greater. In aggregate regional exports would have fallen by 1.7 percentage points more. Again the pattern for individual countries is similar with Chile being the country that benefited most from exports to China, followed by Brazil, Peru and Uruguay. In none of the other countries was the rate of decline in exports reduced by more than 2% as a result of increased exports to China.
The picture that emerges from this analysis is that for Latin America as a whole, exports to China in 2009 did very little to offset the impact of the global financial crisis on the economy. Even when the effects on individual countries are considered, the impacts are found to be quite small and it is only really in Chile where it can be argued that Chinese demand has played a major role in cushioning the effects of the crisis.
Conclusion
Economic relations between China and Latin America have grown dramatically over the 
